

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

MFG. 1-72

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BT

TOP SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0284 *82*

03035

EXDIS

SALT

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SUBJ: SALT: INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER ON COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS
ON SALT TWO

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PO/73/1 AND ANNEX DATED JANUARY 5 BUT JUST
ISSUED BY ACTING SYG PANSA TO ALL PERMREPS:

BEGIN TEXT OF PO:

IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST MADE DURING THE COUNCIL MEETING OF 15TH
DECEMBER, 1972, I FORWARD THE ATTACHED PAPER, PREPARED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL STAFF, REFLECTING THE PRESENT STATE OF ALLIED
CONSULTATION ON THOSE ASPECTS OF SALT TWO WHICH APPEAR TO BE OF
MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THE PAPER IS
INTENDED TO FACILITATE CONTINUED AND FULL EXAMINATION OF THESE
ISSUES BY THE COUNCIL.
END TEXT OF PO.

BEGIN TEXT OF ANNEX:

COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON SALT TWO

1. THE PRESENT PAPER IS BASED ON THE COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS OF
15TH NOVEMBER AND 15TH DECEMBER, 1972, CONCERNING SALT TWO; THE
WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS OF DELEGATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT(1); AND
THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON SALT ONE. *16*

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IT OUTLINES THE STATE OF COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON THOSE ASPECTS OF SALT TWO WHICH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AGREED WOULD MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERN THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THESE ARE:

- THE POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEALING, IN SALT TWO, WITH THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS (FBS);
- THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSFERRING THE FBS PROBLEM FROM SALT TO THE MBFR FORUM;
- THE PROBABLE SOVIET CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION IN THE CENTRAL-SYSTEMS AGGREGATES FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH BALLISTIC MISSILES SUBMARINES;
- THE ISSUE OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

-
- (1) REFERENCES (A) UNITED STATES DELEGATION LETTER CIRCULATED 10TH NOVEMBER
(B) NETHERLANDS DELEGATION SPEAKING NOTES DATED 9TH NOVEMBER
(C) UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION LETTER 28TH NOVEMBER
IP (D) GERMAN DELEGATION LETTER CIRCULATED 14TH DECEMBER
(E) UNITED STATES SALT DELEGATION STATEMENT CIRCULATED 15TH DECEMBER

2. IN DESCRIBING THEIR POSITION AT THE OUTSET OF SALT TWO, THE UNITED STATES SALT DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS, AMONG OTHERS:

(A) THE UNITED STATES DO NOT PLAN TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF FBS OR SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS, BUT WILL CONTINUE TO REJECT ANY SOVIET CONTENTION THAT FBS ARE "STRATEGIC" AND TO REBUT SYSTEMATICALLY AND FORCEFULLY ANY SOVIET PROPOSALS TO REDUCE OR COMPENSATE FOR THESE SYSTEMS OR THEIR BASES.

(B) THE UNITED STATES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER, AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, OTHER WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE FBS ISSUE. ONE POSSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE THE TREATMENT OF FBS ALONG THE LINES OF THE GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL IN THE SPRING OF 1971.

(C) THE UNITED STATES WOULD WELCOME ALLIED VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP OF FBS TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

(D) THE UNITED STATES PLAN TO CONTINUE TO REJECT THE VALIDITY

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OF ANY SOVIET CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION IN THE CENTRAL-SYSTEMS AGGREGATES FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES.

(E) IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE ISSUE OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, THE UNITED STATES PLAN TO RESPOND THAT CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT. THE UNITED STATES HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR POSITION THAT THE NON-TRANSFER PROVISION OF THE ABM TREATY DOES NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR WHATEVER PROVISIONS MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR A TREATY ON OFFENSIVE ARMS.

3. COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON THE FOREGOING ISSUES HAVE ALREADY REVEALED A VERY BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AND AN EMERGING CONSENSUS, AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THESE ISSUES.

(A) THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE FBS ISSUE IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE; AND THAT THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES' FBS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IS ESSENTIAL BOTH FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO STRATEGY AS A WHOLE AND FOR AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUARANTEES TO THE NATO ALLIES IN PARTICULAR. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE INTEGRAL ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO THE DETERRENT STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD IN NO WAY BE JEOPARDIZED. FROM A NATO POINT OF VIEW, THE MOST SATISFACTORY SOLUTION, THEREFORE, WOULD BE TO DISPOSE OF THE FBS PROBLEM, IF IT SHOULD ARISE IN SALT TWO, WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT BEING UNDERTAKEN BY EITHER SIDE.

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SALT

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(B) IT WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE FBS ISSUE OUT OF SLAT TWO ALTOGETHER. IF, AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS HAD TO BE DELAT WITH, A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA MAY, IN FACT, PROVIDE THE LINE OF APPROACH LEAST LIKELY TO BE HARMFUL TO NATO'S SECURITY INTERESTS. SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT GO MOST OF THE WAY TO MEETING THE ALLIED DESIDERATA SET OUT IN THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMAN WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SALT CONSULTATIONS. IN THE COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE, ALLIED INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS WAS STRESSED: IN AVOIDING ANY CONSTRAINTS ON FBS WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSIVE AND DETERRENT STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE; IN KEEPING ANY NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA FLEXIBLE ENOUGH FOR ALL PURPOSES OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING AND OF REINFORCEMENTS AT TIMES OF CRISES; IN ENSURING THAT, IF CONSTRAINTS HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED FOR FBS, RECIPROCAL CONSTRAINTS ARE APPLIED AGAINST COMPARABLE SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS; AND IN ENSURING THE EXCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF NON-US ALLIED FORCES FROM ANY CONSTRAINTS AGREED BILATERALLY IN SALT. IT WAS FELT THAT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES IN GOING BEYOND

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A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTIONAL FORMULA, FOR EXAMPLE IN RESPONSE TO ANY SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR A FREEZE ON OR REDUCTION OF FBS.

(C) PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AGREED THAT ALL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCUSSING FBS IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR RATHER THAN SALT REQUIRED VERY CAREFUL EXAMINATION. ON THE ONE HAND, THE TREATMENT OF FBS IN MBFR MIGHT HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF RESERVING TO MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AN ISSUE WHICH DIRECTLY INVOLVED THE DEFENCE PLANS OF THE ALLIANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, A TRANSFER OF FBS FROM SALT TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD IMPLY PREPAREDNESS TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS IN THESE SYSTEMS, EVEN THOUGH SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS WERE MOSTLY DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA ENVISAGED FOR MBFR. IT MIGHT ALSO NECESSITATE AN UNDESIRABLE WIDENING OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND A CHANGE IN NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THEM. THERE APPEARS TO BE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL FOR THE VIEW THAT THE DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSFERRING THE FBS PROBLEM, AS SUCH, TO THE MBFR FORUM WOULD LIKELY OUTWEIGH ANY POSSIBLE BENEFITS. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT ANY COMMITMENT WHICH WOULD LIMIT WESTERN OPTIONS ON THE HANDLING OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN SALT TWO.

(D) THE COUNCIL HAS NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL THE QUESTIONS OF SOVIET CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION FOR ALLIED BALLISTIC MISSILES SYSTEMS AND OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IT HAS, HOWEVER, NOTED WITH APPROVAL THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON THESE ISSUES. IT ALSO NOTED A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT STATING THAT; PROVIDED THE TERMS OF ANY NON-TRANSFER AGREEMENT WERE CAREFULLY WORDED, THE DISADVANTAGES FOR ALLIED TECHNOLOGICAL ASSETS COULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM.

4. THE COUNCIL AGREED TO CONTINUE, AT AN EARLY DATE FULL CONSULTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN SALT TWO. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SPECIFICALLY STRESSED THE NEED FOR THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF ALL IMPLICATIONS OF A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA AND CLOSE EXAMINATION OF ITS PRECISE TERMS, BEFORE ANY FIRM NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS ARE ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES SALT DELEGATION, REFERRING TO THE PAST RECORD OF COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON SALT, PARTICULARLY TO THE CONSULTATIONS CONDUCTED

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IN THE SPRING OF 1971 ON A NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA, STATED
THAT THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THIS SPHERE OF CONSULTATIONS
COINCIDED WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

END TEXT. XGDS-3

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